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1  Introduction
Studying the economics of climate change, economists often use so-called integrated assessment 
models (IAMs) that combine the framework of a neoclassical growth model with a climate mod-
ule. The major subject of study is the economically optimal emission mitigation path, which ac-
counts for mitigation costs on the one hand and climate damage costs on the other hand. The lat-
ter are represented by a damage function that describes the economic impacts of climate change. 
Typically, these damage functions are based only on the absolute temperature increase compared 
to the pre-industrial level, but not on the rate of temperature increase, i.e., the increase in temper-
ature that occurs per decade. 
However, as stressed several times in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (see IPCC 2014), and 
as underlined by a growing body of literature from the natural and - to a smaller extend - from the 
social sciences, the rate of temperature increase is also an important driver of overall damages 
caused by climate change. Consequently, neglecting such rate-related damages leads to subopti-
mal emission mitigation caused by an underestimation of damages.
This paper incorporates rate-related damages into the well-known DICE-2016R model by Wil-
liam Nordhaus (2018). Using the resulting model variant DICE-RD we analyze the potential wel-
fare effects caused by the rate of temperature increase for several different scenarios. Each sce-
nario compares the net output stemming from the optimal climate policy with the net output re-
sulting from the reference policy that ignores rate-related damages. The differences in net output
then can be interpreted as the economic losses that occur if rate-related damages are disregarded.
Employing DICE-2016R for our analysis has several reasons. Since the development of the first 
version (Nordhaus 1994), DICE has probably become the most popular integrated assessment 
model in the economics of climate change and its codes are publicly available.1 Moreover, due to 
its popularity, DICE entails the advantage that our results are comparable with those of many 
other studies using the same model family. 
The present paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 illustrates the importance of rate-related damag-
es by some examples from the literature, and section 3 provides an overview on the incorporation 
of those damages in IAMs so far. In section 4, we shortly outline those parts of the DICE-2016R 
model that are important for our analysis, and in section 5, we incorporate rate-related damages 
into this model. In section 6, we discuss the results of our base scenario, and in section 7, we pre-
sent a sensitivity analysis. Finally, in section 8, we summarize our main findings and highlight 
the need for further research.
                                                             
1 The source code of DICE-2016R can be downloaded at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/
homepage/DICE2016R-091916ap.gms. Last access at 28/01/2019. 
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2  Impacts of the Rate of Temperature Increase
The harmful impacts caused by a high rate of temperature increase are best understood in the 
field of ecosystems and biodiversity (for an overview of studies see Warren 2006). Several spe-
cies of flora and fauna are endangered by displacement or even complete extinction when the 
temperature increases faster than they are able to adapt to climate change. This adaptation may be 
a migration to new habitats with more suitable conditions,2 or a change in the distribution of phe-
notypes within a given species towards the better-adapted ones (e.g., Visser 2008, Corlett and 
Westcott 2013). The capability of species to adapt by migration or genetic evolution, however,
naturally depends on how fast the climate is changing. Hence, rates of temperature increase that 
exceed a certain threshold will reduce biodiversity by selecting for highly mobile or opportunistic 
species (Malcolm et al. 2002). 
In particular, according to Leemans and Eickhout (2004), the adaptive capacity of forest ecosys-
tems is much lower than the one of other ecosystems.3 This is of considerable importance for the 
future trend of climate change, since the decomposition processes associated with a large-scale 
dieback of forests would lead to huge releases of CO2 from the terrestrial biosphere thereby pro-
ducing a significant feedback mechanism that accelerates global warming (Neilson 1993).  
Acceptable thresholds for the rate of temperature increase, where the adaptive capacity of most 
species and ecosystems can cope with climate change, have been studied for more than 25 years. 
Early estimates suggest a “tolerable window” of not more than 0.1°C per decade (Vellinga and 
Swart 1991). More recent studies come to similar conclusions ranging from 0.05°C per decade 
(van Vliet and Leemans 2006) to 0.2°C per decade (Petschel-Held et al. 1999, Leemans and 
Eickhout 2004). In contrast, assuming “business as usual”-conditions Nordhaus (2018) calculates 
a temperature trajectory that implies an average rate of temperature increase of more than 0.3°C 
per decade during this century.  
Besides ecosystems and biodiversity, the rate of temperature increase has impacts on several oth-
er sectors. The most obvious ones are agriculture and forestry. In agriculture, this relates to the 
adaptation of agricultural practices to changing environmental conditions. Additional costs occur 
whenever agents fail to adapt properly. However, proper adaptation requires the building of ap-
propriate institutions that can create adaptive capacity in the agricultural sector (Lobell et al. 
                                                             
2 I.e., moving pole-wards or moving to higher altitudes in case of increasing temperatures (e.g., Loarie et 
al. 2009). However, as Malcolm et al. (2002) point out, the current rates of temperature increase require 
migration rates of species and biomes that are much faster than those observed during the complete 
postglacial period.
3 For example, at a rate of temperature increase of 0.3°C per decade, 30% of all impacted ecosystems are 
still able to adapt within a century, but only 17% of all impacted forests (Leemans and Eickhout, 2004, 
p. 226). 
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2008). The faster climate change occurs, the less likely it is that these institutions can be estab-
lished in time (Bellon et al. 2011, Tambo and Aboulaye 2012, 2013).4  
In forestry, the impacts of the rate of temperature increase stem from commercially used tree spe-
cies. These are affected by climate change because suitable regions are moving pole-wards due to 
global warming. When the rate of temperature increase is too fast, the species’ population will 
overall decline because natural migration to suitable regions cannot cope with the pace of climate 
change. Consequently, in forestry proper migration to new habitats needs to be commercially 
assisted (Zhu et al. 2012, Pedlar et al. 2012). 
Moreover, although specific literature on this topic is still scarce, several other sectors are poten-
tially affected by the rate of temperature increase. In particular, the adaptation of human systems 
to climate change often presupposes huge time-consuming investments in knowledge, institutions
and physical infrastructure. Prominent examples are adaptation requirements in the fields of 
coastal protection, freshwater supply and public health (see IPCC 2014, Chapter 16). A high rate 
of temperature increase entails the danger that these measures cannot keep up with the speed of 
warming.5
Another issue within the present context are so-called “tipping points” where climatic conditions 
change abruptly, irreversibly and in a manner hard to predict.6 Lenton (2011) attributes the risks 
of passing such tipping points directly to the rates of temperature increase. However, the rates 
that would considerably increase the probability of passing such an event are far above those 
leading to the problems discussed above. Therefore, the issue of tipping points will be neglected 
in the following analysis.  
3  Rate-Related Damages in Integrated Assessment Models
The damage function of DICE-2016R, as well as those of most other IAMs, relies exclusively on 
the absolute level of temperature increase. However, as substantiated in the last section, the rate 
of temperature increase is an important driver of damages as well. When the first generation of
IAMs came up in the early 1990s, this issue had been discussed but, with the exceptions de-
scribed below, the damage functions employed in IAMs do not account for rate-related damages. 
                                                             
4 Since adaptive capacity in the developed countries is considered to be high, the problems described 
above are primarily virulent in developing countries and in the subsistence farming sector.
5 According to the IPCC (Field et al. 2014, p. 80), this problem is particularly pressing in the Polar Re-
gions where the rate of temperature increase is about twice as high as the global average (see also Nor-
wegian Polar Institute 2014).
6 Examples are the shutoff of the Atlantic deep-water formation or the collapse of the Indian summer 
monsoon (e.g., Lenton et al. 2008).
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The earliest exception traces back to the work of Peck and Teisberg (1994). The authors compare 
the results of their original CETA model, where damages are driven by the absolute level of tem-
perature, with those of a modified version where damages depend on the rate of temperature in-
crease. Their main finding is that optimal mitigation rates rather hinge on the shape of the dam-
age function (e.g., quadratic or cubic) than on the question whether the absolute level or the rate 
of temperature increase is considered. The modified damage function used by Peck and Teisberg 
(1994), however, does not account for both variables at the same time. Consequently, the authors 
do not analyze the joint-effects of both damage categories. Moreover, nowadays the CETA model 
stemming from the early nineties is outdated in its parameterization. 
Another IAM that partially accounts for rate-related damages is the FUND model (Tol 1997, Tol 
and Anthoff 2010). In their approach, however, only the impacts on agriculture depend on the 
absolute level as well as on the rate of temperature increase, whereas the impacts on all other 
sectors are modeled in the conventional way. Moreover, FUND exhibits only a limited degree of 
endogeneity since production activities and the resulting emissions follow exogenous trajectories. 
Consequently, in contrast to DICE, it is not possible to derive a complete first-best solution in-
cluding the optimal level of production. 
Also the PAGE model (Hope 2006, 2013) accounts to some extend for rate-related damages. This 
model, however, is a probabilistic simulation model that mainly serves to analyze the impacts of 
uncertainty. The degree of endogeneity is even lower than in FUND, because not only production 
but also mitigation rates are exogenous. Hence, within PAGE it is not possible to investigate the 
impact of rate-related damages on optimal climate policies.7  
The most recent contribution is the work of Goes et al. (2011) who analyze the effects of aerosol 
geoengineering within the DICE-2007 model. Since the injection of aerosols into the atmosphere 
can lead to very fast changes in temperature, the authors use a modified damage function based 
on the rate of temperature increase in terms of 5-year and 30-year running averages. However, 
the focus of Goes et al. (2011) is solely on the effects of geoengineering. Their general approach 
as well as their damage function are not designed to investigate the role of rate-related damages 
in determining optimal climate policies.
Finally, it should be noted that all models mentioned above ignore that rate-related damages are 
only likely to occur if the rate of temperature increase exceeds a certain threshold. Neglecting this 
threshold-dependency in the calculation of optimal emission mitigation generates skewed results.
                                                             
7 For a more throughout comparison between DICE, FUND and PAGE see Stanton et al. (2009).
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4  The DICE-2016R Model    
In the following, we describe only those parts of the DICE-2016R model that are important for 
our analysis.8 Utility is expressed by a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function:  
??
???
?
??
?
?1
)t(c
)t(L)]t(L),t(c[U
?1
. (1) 
The time index t indicates the specific period, c(t) is per capita consumption, L(t) is the popula-
?????????? is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. The objective function to be max-
imized is the welfare function W. The latter consists of the discounted utility summed up over a 
finite time horizon of 100 periods each covering five years: 
)]t(L),t(c[U
)?1(
1
)]t(L),t(c[W
T
1t
1t?? ??? . (2) 
????????????????????????? the pure rate of social time preference, which is set at 1.5%. The pro-
duction function is of Cobb-Douglas type ? ??? 1Y(t) A(t)K(t) L(t) with Y(t) indicating gross 
output. A(t) is the total factor productivity, K(t) is the capital stock, L(t) is not only the popula-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The link to the climate module is formed via greenhouse gas emissions, which are caused by pro-
duction due to an exogenous emission coefficient that declines over time. These emissions lead to 
a higher atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration that causes an increase in radiative forcing. In 
the next step, the increased radiative forcing triggers a higher level of temperature. The economic 
impact of this temperature increase is given by the damage function D(t), which describes the 
share of output lost due to climate damages:
?? ? ?? ? 21 AT 2 ATD(t) T (t) T (t) . (3) 
TAT(t) indicates the increase of the global atmospheric mean temperature compared to the pre-
industrial level, and ?i  (i=1,2) are parameters that govern the shape of the damage function. 
In order to avoid damages, emissions can be reduced by mitigation activities. The accompanying 
cost function ?????is defined in terms of the share of output spent for mitigation activities:  
?? ?? ?? 21(t) (t) (4) 
??????????indicating the mitigation rate (i.e., the share of emissions avoided), and the parameters 
?i (i=1,2) determine the shape of the mitigation cost function. 
                                                             
8 For some more details on DICE-2016R see Nordhaus (2018). Since most parts of DICE-2016R are 
identical to DICE-2013R, the reader could also refer to the more throughout description of the latter 
model provided by Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013). 
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Finally, subtracting damages and mitigation costs from the gross output Y(t) yields the remaining 
net output ? ? ??netY (t) [1 D(t) (t)]Y(t) to be divided into consumption and investment. The
latter equation highlights the typical trade-off in climate policies: More emission mitigation leads 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??? ???? ????? ??????
more emission mitigation leads to lower damages D(t) resulting in an increasing net output.
5  From DICE-2016R to DICE-RD
To transform DICE-2016R into DICE-RD we have to modify the damage function (3). The new 
function should incorporate the absolute level as well as the rate of temperature increase as a 
driver of damages. Moreover, it should account for the threshold-dependency of rate-related 
damages. Both requirements can be satisfied via replacing the original damage function D(t) by
the new damage function Z(t):
? ? ? ?? ? ??21 AT 2 ATZ(t): [ T (t) T (t) ] (t) . (5) 
The term in square brackets on the RHS of (5) represents the original damage function D(t) and 
the multiplier 1)t(? ? accounts for the effect of rate-related damages.9 The latter depend on the 
rate of temperature increase defined as ? ? ? ?AT AT ATT (t): T (t) T (t 1) : 
?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ??? ?
ATT (t) 0.5(t): 1 B(t)
100 0.5
. (6) 
The parameters ? and ? govern the shape of the multiplier-function )t(? , and ? indicates the 
critical threshold for the rate of temperature increase measured in °C per decade. Since each peri-
od of DICE-2016R covers only five years, we have to use an internal threshold of ?0.5 in our 
model. The damage parameter ? is calibrated in such a way that it indicates the percentage in-
crease in total damages if the increase in temperature between two periods is twice as high as the 
internal threshold, i.e. ? ??ATT (t) . Moreover, according to the binary variable B(t) defined be-
low in (7), rate-related damages only occur if the rate of temperature increase between two peri-
ods exceeds the internal threshold of ?0.5 . Otherwise, we obtain a multiplier of 1)t(? ? and the 
new damage function Z(t) equals the original one D(t):  
     
? ? ???? ? ? ? ??
0 0 5
1 0 5
( ) .( ):
( ) .
AT
AT
if T t
B t
if T t
. (7) 
                                                             
9 Systems that are already disturbed by the absolute level of temperature increase will probably have 
more problems coping with the additional stress stemming from a high rate of temperature increase. 
Therefore, we assume a multiplicative instead of an additive relationship between damages caused by 
the rate of temperature increase and damages caused by the absolute level of temperature increase.
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As an example, Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the damage-multiplier )t(? for the case of ??0.1 ,
??2 and varying magnitudes of the parameter ? . 
Figure 1. Shape of the damage-multiplier )t(? for an example with ??0.1 , ??2 and varying 
magnitudes of the parameter ? . 
In our base scenario in section 6, we employ the best guess threshold of 0.1°C per decade, i.e.
? ?0.1 . In contrast to this more or less reliable figure (see section 2), the range of the parameters 
? and ? is almost completely uncertain. At the present state of insights from the social and natu-
ral sciences, we can only conclude that ? should be strictly positive, and ? should be larger than 
one since rate-related damages are expected to increase more than proportionately when the rate 
of temperature increase becomes larger (e.g., Leemans and Eickhout 2004). Our base scenario 
assumes a quadratic shape of the multiplier-function, i.e. 2?? . Moreover, to avoid overestimat-
ing rate-related damages, we assume in the base scenario that damages increase only by moderate
2.5% if the rate of temperature increase is twice as high as the critical threshold, i.e. ??2.5 . This 
magnitude does not seem unrealistically high since ecosystems and agriculture, which are two of 
the sectors most affected by the rate of temperature increase, account for about 15 to 20% of total 
damages caused by an increase in temperature of 2.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels (Nord-
haus and Boyer, 2000, p.91). Moreover, the effects of varying the parameters ? and ? as well as 
varying the threshold ? will be analyzed by a sensitivity analysis in section 7.1. 
6  Results for the Base Scenario
In this section, we discuss the results stemming from our modified model DICE-RD and compare 
them to the results of the original DICE-2016R model.10 As usual in studies based on DICE, we 
                                                             
10 All calculations have been performed using the GAMS-software version win64/24.1 with the BONMIN 
solver. The latter is capable of solving mixed integer problems, which is necessary due to the use of a 
binary variable. The program files are available from the corresponding author on request.
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consider only the results for the first 200 years although both models cover a time horizon of 500 
years in total.11 The major endogenous policy variable is ?????????????????????????that describes the 
share of emissions avoided. For convenience, in the text mitigation rates are expressed as per-
centages although in the original GAMS-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expressed as decimals.  
Figure 2. Optimal mitigation rates. Left-hand scale: DICE-2016R. Right-hand scale: Differences
between DICE-RD and DICE2016R. 
The left-hand scale of Figure 2 indicates the optimal mitigation rates resulting from the original 
DICE-2016R model as calculated by Nordhaus (2018). For the first period the mitigation rate is 
exogenously fixed. The first endogenously optimized mitigation rate occurs in 2015 with roughly 
19%. From that point on, the mitigation rates rise steadily until they reach their temporary upper 
limit of 100% in 2110. Subsequently, in 2150 the mitigation rates jump to 120% since the upper 
limit is relaxed by the assumption that a “negative emissions”-technology becomes available.12
Moreover, it should be noted that the optimal mitigation path stemming from DICE2016R leads 
to a temperature trajectory that significantly violates the best-guess threshold of 0.1°C per decade 
during the first 100 years. Calculated over this time-span, the average damage-multiplier ?(t)
amounts to a magnitude of approximately 1.09 under the assumptions of our base scenario.  
The right-hand scale of Figure 2 indicates the results of our own calculations using DICE-RD
with the base assumptions ??2.5 , ??2 and ??0.1 . To enhance the graphical depiction, we do 
not display the absolute mitigation rates but their differences to the original mitigation rates 
                                                             
11 Considering a longer time span would even reinforce our results since the vast majority of economic 
losses caused by neglecting rate-related damages occur not before the next centuries.
12 E.g., technologies that use chemical reactions to capture CO2 directly from the air (Socolow et al. 2011).
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stemming from DICE2016R. As shown by Figure 2, these differences increase steadily until they 
converge back to zero in 2110. The reason for the latter behavior is straightforward since in 2110 
the mitigation rates in both models reach their upper limit of 100% such that no more differences 
occur. 
The preliminary results from our base scenario suggest that the impact of rate-related damages on 
optimal climate policies is non-negligible since the differences shown in Figure 2 rise up to a peak
level of almost six percentage points around 2070. However, as already emphasized in section 1, 
the main objective of our analysis is to quantify the economic losses that are caused if climate 
policy ignores rate-related damages. The calculation of these losses is performed in three steps:
– In the first step, we calculate the net output that results if the optimal mitigation rates as de-
rived from DICE-RD are employed.
– In the second step, we run DICE-RD with exogenous mitigation rates that are fixed to the lev-
els stemming from DICE-2016R as shown at the left-hand scale of Figure 2. Hence, for rough-
ly the first 100 years, we force DICE-RD to employ suboptimal low rates. This yields the net 
output that results if the applied mitigation rates neglect rate-related damages although they 
are present in the model.  
– In the third step, the differences in net output between the optimal run (first step) and the run 
with fixed mitigation rates (second step) are calculated. These differences can be interpreted as 
the economic losses caused by a climate policy that neglects rate-related damages.
The results of this comparison in absolute (i.e., undiscounted) trillions of 2005 US-$ per year are 
shown in Figure 3.13 Remarkably, the output losses for roughly the first 70 years are slightly neg-
ative. Negative losses imply that actually the suboptimal climate policy, which ignores rate-
related damages, is economically beneficial in those periods. The reason is obvious since the op-
timal climate policy requires higher mitigation rates. This leads immediately to higher mitigation 
costs, whereas the majority of the benefits in terms of a lower increase in temperature accrue in 
the distant future. Consequently, when considering only the first couple of periods, employing 
suboptimal low mitigation rates leads to an increase in net output. Around the year 2080, howev-
er, this situation changes drastically: The output losses caused by ignoring rate-related damages 
become positive and increase sharply. The reason is that the optimal mitigation rates converge to 
the original rates stemming from DICE-2016R as shown in Figure 2. Hence, in the following 
decades, the additional mitigation costs implied by the optimal climate policy tend to zero, but 
the economy still profits from the increased mitigation rates in the past.
                                                             
13 The same calculation can be performed for the variables consumption and investments. Apart from the 
absolute values, the resulting diagrams are mostly similar to those for net output.  
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Figure 3. Losses in net output if climate policy ignores rate-related damages.
At first glance, the output losses depicted in Figure 3 seem to be enormous. It should be noted,
however, that output is a global figure within DICE. Moreover, most of the output losses occur in 
the distant future. For the latter reason, we calculated the present value of cumulative losses in 
net output employing the real interest rates resulting from DICE-2016R.14 The resulting magni-
tude amounts to 5.3 trillion 2005 US-$. Compared to the present value of net output in the opti-
mum, this implies relative losses of only about 0.08%. Of course, due to the intertemporal distri-
bution of losses, this figure might be biased by discounting (see also section 7.2).
7  Sensitivity Analysis
As a general shortcoming, the results of IAMs like DICE crucially depend on the magnitude of 
several parameters, which are highly uncertain or at least disputed in the literature (e.g. Pindyck 
2013, NASEM 2017). Fixing the parameters of our multiplier-function (6) adds another source of 
uncertainty since the extent to which the rate of temperature increase affects ecological and social 
systems is poorly understood. Therefore, in section 7.1 we analyze the effects caused by varying
the parameters of the multiplier-function.  
Moreover, one of the most important parameters influencing optimal mitigation is the pure rate of 
social time preference, which is controversially discussed in the literature (e.g., Arrow et al. 
1996, Hof et al. 2012). Concerning the issue under consideration, the effects of discounting might 
even be stronger since the output losses caused by neglecting rate-related damages mainly occur 
in the distant future. Consequently, the effects of varying the pure rate of social time preference
are analyzed in section 7.2.  
                                                             
14 Note that these rates are declining in time. They range from 5.1% p.a. for the first period to 2.8% p.a. 
for the last period of the considered time horizon. 
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7.1  Parameters of the Multiplier-Function
As already emphasized in section 5, the parameter ? describes the percentage by which total 
damages increase if the rate of temperature increase is twice as high as the critical threshold. In
our base scenario we assumed ??2.5 . Now we consider two additional cases: A “low damage”-
scenario with 1?? and a “high damage”-scenario with ??5. As expected, an increase in ? rein-
forces the differences in mitigation rates whereas a decrease in ? causes the opposite effect (see 
Figure 4). However, even in the “low damage”-scenario we still obtain non-negligible differences
that peak at about 2.5 percentage points around 2070. 
Figure 4. Optimal mitigation rates: Differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for varying 
damage parameter ? (assuming ??2 and ??0.1 ).
Figure 5. Losses in net output for varying damage parameter ? (assuming ??2 and ??0.1 ).  
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For all three scenarios, the losses in net output caused by ignoring rate-related damages follow 
the same general trend (see Figure 5): At the beginning of the time horizon they are slightly nega-
tive, but later on they become positive and start to increase more or less sharply. The only differ-
ence relates to their absolute levels. In the “high damage”-scenario the present value of losses in 
net output increases up to 11.2 trillion US-$ implying relative losses of about 0.17%. In the “low 
damage”-scenario losses shrink down to 2 trillion US-$ or about 0.03%, respectively. 
Next, we turn to the effects of changing the parameter ? that determines the convexity of the 
multiplier-function (t)? . In addition to the quadratic case with 2?? considered above, we ana-
lyze a linear specification 1?? and a cubic specification 3?? .15 Compared to the quadratic 
specification, the linear one implies that rates of temperature increase below the calibration point 
of 0.1°C per period lead to higher damages, whereas rates above 0.1°C per period lead to lower 
damages. The opposite effects occur when switching from the quadratic to the cubic specifica-
tion. The results of these calculations are shown in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. Except 
for a short time span around 2090 to 2110, increasing or decreasing the parameter ? has essen-
tially the same effects as increasing or decreasing ? (albeit the absolute magnitude of effects is 
somewhat different). Using the cubic instead of the quadratic specification increases the relative 
losses in present value of net output from 0.08% up to 0.22%, whereas using the linear specifica-
tion we obtain a decline down to roughly 0.03%.  
Finally, we analyze changes in the critical threshold for rate-related damages. Proceeding from
the magnitude of 0.1°C/decade assumed so far, we consider a less severe threshold of 0.2°C/dec-
ade and a more severe one of 0.05°C/decade as suggested by the literature (see section 2). For 
both cases we again assume ??2.5 and the quadratic specification ??2 . Figures A.3 and A.4 in 
the Appendix show the results of these calculations. Assuming the less severe threshold of 0.2°C/
decade, the impacts of rate-related damages vanish almost completely since the optimal solution 
of the original DICE-2016R violates this threshold only slightly during the first couple of periods. 
In contrast, for a threshold of 0.05°C/decade the differences in mitigation rates almost quadruple 
compared to the base scenario. Consequently, the losses in present value of net output increase up 
to 37 trillion US-$ implying relative losses of about 0.57%. These results show that the economic 
effects of rate-related damages react rather sensitively to changes in the critical threshold.
Figure 6 summarizes the results from our sensitivity analysis in terms of the relative losses in 
present value of net output caused by ignoring rate-related damages. Overall, these results sug-
gests that potential economic impacts of rate-related damages range from almost negligible 
0.03% to a more substantial 0.57%.  
                                                             
15 We are aware that the linear specification is a limiting case that is actually unrealistic in view of the 
present state of knowledge (see section 5).  
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Figure 6. Summary of sensitivity analysis: Relative losses in present value of net output [%].
The variations considered in the sensitivity analysis above, however, can also occur simultane-
ously thereby reinforcing each other. Hence, to illustrate the possible extend of the problem at 
hand, we also calculated a “worst case”-scenario that combines the most critical assumptions. In 
detail, we assumed that the multiplier-function ?(t) is cubic, the threshold for the occurrence of 
rate related damages amounts to 0.05°C per decade, and total damages increase by 5% if the rate 
of temperature increase is twice as high as the critical threshold. As a result we found that differ-
ences in mitigation rates rise to a peak level of about 48 percentage points already around the 
year 2040, and the losses in present value of net output amount to 485 trillion US-$ or about 
7.6%, respectively. Consequently, under ”worst case”-conditions, which cannot be ruled out
completely at the present state of knowledge, rate-related damages can lead to serious economic 
losses. 
7.2  Pure Rate of Social Time Preference  
In the following we again refer to the base scenario with ??2.5 , ??2 and a threshold of 0.1°C 
per decade, but now we consider the impacts caused by reducing the pure rate of social time pref-
erence ? from 1.5% (as used so far) to 1% and 0.5%. Of course, in order to guarantee compara-
bility, the lower values of ? are employed in our extended model DICE-RD as well as in the orig-
inal model DICE-2016R. In both models, decreasing ?? causes the mitigation rates to increase 
more rapidly since future climate damages gain more weight against early mitigation costs. In 
DICE-2016R, however, these effects are stronger than in DICE-RD. Consequently, lowering the 
rate of social time preference diminishes the differences in mitigation rates (see Figure 7). More-
over, the smaller is ? the earlier the mitigation rates approach to their upper limit of 100% such 
that differences converge back to zero.  
0 0,ϭ 0,Ϯ 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6
??1.0 ??2 ??0.10
??2.5 ??2 ??0.10
??5.0 ??2 ??0.10
??2.5 ??1 ??0.10
??2.5 ??3 ??0.10
??2.5 ??2 ??0.20
??2.5 ??2 ??0.05
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Figure 7. Optimal mitigation rates: Differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for varying 
rate of social time preference ? . 
Figure 8. Losses in net output for varying rate of social time preference ? . 
Of course, the diminishing differences in mitigation rates also lead to smaller losses in net output. 
As shown by Figure 8, the corresponding decline amounts to roughly 50 to 80%. Calculating the 
present value of losses in net output, however, yields a result that is somewhat puzzling at first 
glance: Reducing ? from 1.5% to 1% we obtain a slight increase from 5.3 to 5.5 trillion US-$,
whereas a further reduction of ? down to 0.5% induces a decrease to 4 trillion US-$. The answer 
to this puzzle is that lowering the rate of social time preference does not only increase mitigation 
rates but it has two additional effects: It increases total output via a higher degree of capital ac-
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cumulation and at the same time it diminishes the real interest rates to be used for discounting.16
Consequently, it seems to be more sensible to compare relative figures that are less distorted by 
these effects. Looking in this way at our calculations we obtain a clear-cut result: Reducing ? al-
ways reduces the relative losses in present value of net output. For ??0.01 the relative losses 
drop down from 0.08 to 0.06%, and for ??0.005 they drop down further to almost negligible 
0.025%. As these results show, applying a lower rate of social time preference in determining 
optimal climate policies could avoid a good deal of the problem under consideration.  
8  Summary and Conclusions
Given the growing evidence concerning the importance of the rate of temperature increase, ne-
glecting this aspect is an obvious shortcoming in the economics of climate change. Especially 
IAMs that aim at calculating optimal mitigation rates should incorporate all sources of damages 
in order to generate reliable results. In the present paper, we contributed to the corresponding
literature in three ways: 
- First, we showed how to incorporate damages caused by the rate of temperature increase into 
the well-known DICE-2016R model. In doing so, we particularly accounted for the hitherto 
neglected fact that rate-related damages are only likely to occur when the rate of temperature 
increase exceeds a certain threshold that overstrains the adaptive capacity of ecological and 
social systems. Moreover, we decided to model the relationship between damages caused by 
the absolute level of temperature increase and damages caused by the rate of temperature in-
crease in a multiplicative instead of an additive manner. The reason is that systems, which are 
already disturbed by the absolute level of temperature increase, will probably have more prob-
lems coping with the additional stress stemming from a high rate of temperature increase.
- Second, using our modified model DICE-RD we analyzed various different scenarios in order 
to derive a large range of simulation results. A climate policy, which relies on the mitigation 
rates stemming from the original DICE-2016R model, can lead to significant rate-related dam-
ages since it implies a rate of temperature increase that heavily exceeds the best-guess thresh-
old of 0.1°C/decade during the current century. Accounting for these potential damages, opti-
mality requires a considerable increase in mitigation rates. Under “worst case”-assumptions, 
this required increase can rise to a peak level of about 48 percentage points.  
- Third, we quantified the losses in net output caused by an insufficient climate policy that ig-
nores rate-related damages. Depending on the scenario considered, the relative losses in the 
present value of net output compared to the optimal solution range from almost negligible 
                                                             
16 With ??0.01 the real interest rates range from 4.8% p.a. for the first period to 2.3% p.a. for the last 
period of the considered time horizon. For ??0.005 the corresponding figures are 4.5 and 1.8%.
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0.03% to a substantial magnitude of 7.6% in the “worst case”-scenario. Although the vast ma-
jority of output losses occur in the distant future, everything else equal the present value of 
relative losses is the higher, the higher the applied rate of social time preference is. Conse-
quently, applying a lower rate of social time preference could avoid a good deal of rate-related 
damages. 
However, the limitations of our work are obvious. Besides the well-known criticisms on IAMs in 
general (see, e.g., Ackerman et al. 2009, Pindyck 2013, 2017) it should be emphasized that our 
extension of DICE-2016R adds further uncertainties. Although it seems to be possible to narrow 
the empirical range of the critical threshold for the rate of temperate increase, there are no reliable 
data on the specific magnitude of rate-related damages available from the literature. Hence, we 
utilized scenario analysis to illustrate the potential effects of such damages. In order to increase 
the reliability of our results, it is necessary to narrow the empirical parameterization of our ex-
tended damage function. For this purpose, much more research is required in the natural as well 
as in the social sciences.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Optimal mitigation rates - differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for 
varying convexity parameter ? (assuming ??2.5 and ??0.1 ).
Figure A.2: Losses in net output if climate policy ignores rate-related damages for varying 
convexity parameter ? (assuming ??2.5 and ??0.1 ).
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
60
20
70
20
80
20
90
21
00
21
10
21
20
21
30
21
40
21
50
21
60
21
70
21
80
21
90
22
00D
if
fe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
D
IC
E
-R
D
an
d 
D
IC
E
-2
01
6R
ʘсϭ (linear) ʘсϮ (quadratic) ʘс3 (cubic)
-1
3
7
11
15
19
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
60
20
70
20
80
20
90
21
00
21
10
21
20
21
30
21
40
21
50
21
60
21
70
21
80
21
90
22
00
L
os
se
s 
 in
  n
et
  o
ut
pu
t
[t
ri
lli
on
s 
20
10
 U
S-
$ 
 p
er
  y
ea
r]
ʘсϭ (linear)     ʘсϮ (quadratic)     ʘс3 (cubic)
20
 
Figure A.3: Optimal mitigation rates - differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for 
varying thresholds ? (assuming ??2.5 and ??2 ).
Figure A.4: Losses in net output if climate policy ignores rate-related damages for varying 
thresholds ? (assuming ??2.5 and ??2 ).
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